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Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens in Patent Infringement
Actions: A Uniform Approach Toward the Situs
of the Tort
David Wille
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may
have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to
reality, and injustice rather than justice is promoted. 1

Each year, U.S. businesses lose billions of dollars in sales to foreign
competitors who have copied American inventions. 2 In the last decade, motivated by threats to the United States' competitiveness by foreign corporations that thrive on copying U.S. technology, 3 Congress
and federal courts have revolutionized the protection of intellectual
property rights, particularly patent rights. 4 Despite the recent emphasis on protecting intellectual property rights, remaining jurisdictional
loopholes may allow aliens to escape the revolution's impact.
In the wake oflarge losses caused by foreign copying of inventions,
Congress realized that "strong foreign competition derives in large
measure from weak intellectual property protection." 5 This appreciation produced dramatic results. In 1982, prompted by the negative
attitude of many federal courts toward patents, Congress created the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 6 This new court has stringently guarded the rights of patent owners. Prior to 1982, federal
courts held only about thirty percent of patents valid; today, nearly
eighty percent of patents challenged are ultimately found valid. 7 Federal courts and Congress continue to strengthen intellectual property
rights in an attempt to extend the reach of these rights to more activities of alien corporations. 8 United States patent holders will find suits
1. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1961).
2. Paula Dwyer et al., The Battle Raging Over "Intellectual Property," Bus. WK., May 2,
1989, at 78, 78 (The United States International Trade Commission estimates the annual loss at
$61 billion.).
3. Raymond D. Foltz & Thomas A. Penn, The Perils of Patent Infringement, MACHINE DE·
SIGN, Apr. 12, 1990, at 105, 105 (observing that Congress strengthened patent laws in response to
such threats).
4. Norm Alster, New Profits from Patents, FORTUNE, Apr. 25, 1988, at 185; see also Dwyer
et al., supra note 2, at 78-79.
5. Alster, supra note 4, at 188.
6. See id.
7. Dwyer et al., supra note 2, at 79.
8. Foltz & Penn, supra note 3, at 105 ("[J]udicial and legislative initiatives have altered the
way American companies view patent infringement."); Jon Connole, Law Firms Pushing to De·
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against alien corporations for patent infringement increasingly necessary to prevent further losses in competitiveness, and to protect their
intellectual property rights.
One might assume that the revolution in patent protection would
also lead to lower jurisdictional barriers to suit. In the area of personal jurisdiction over alien infringers,9 however, significant barriers
remain. 10 Because jurisdictional barriers to suit against alien infringers may thwart the recent initiatives of Congress, the reasoning used to
support these jurisdictional decisions merits careful examination. This
Note considers the common jurisdictional problem of obtaining personal jurisdiction over an alien infringer who sells infringing products
to a U.S. distributor outside of the United States, who, in tum, resells
the infringing products in the United States.1 1
The importance of obtaining a judgment against an alien in this
paradigmatic setting cannot be overstated. The alien manufacturer is
the source of supply. If the patent owner does not cut off that source,
the possibility of future infringement remains. 12 Judgments against
U.S. distributors are unlikely to prevent future infringement because
alien infringers can easily find new distributors. 13 Venue or personal
jurisdiction restrictions also may make joining all of the distributors in
a single suit diffi.cult. 14 In addition, the alien source of supply may be
velop Intellectual Property Practices, CRAIN'S CLEVELAND Bus., Sept. 18, 1989, at 4, 4 (Due to
foreign competition, Congress has passed 14 laws strengthening intellectual property rights since
1983.); Elizabeth Corcoran, Likely Litigation; Companies Wield Lawsuits as a Market-Development Tool, Sci. AM., Mar. 1990, at 76, 76 (Congress strengthened patent protection against
aliens in a 1988 trade act.); Merrill Goozner, More Global Patent Litigation Seen, CHI. TulB.,
May 3, 1989, § 3, at 3 (Courts are more willing to grant preliminary injunctions against alien
infringers.).
9. For purposes of this Note, the term "alien infringer" refers to a nonresident alien who
manufactures products outside of the United States which infringe a U.S. patent when sold in the
United States.
10. See, e.g., Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over alien infringer).
11. See Clinton Neagley, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign Inducers ofInfringement, 58
J. PAT. OFF. SocY. 712 (1976). This paradigm case differs from a case where the United States
distributor can be considered the alter ego of the alien corporation, as is often the case when the
distributor is a subsidiary of the alien corporation. When the distributor is an alter ego, the alien
is deemed to act wherever its alter ego acts and, therefore, normally does business in the United
States. See, e.g., Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra Sys., Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1576, 1581,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1809, 1812 (N.D. Ga. 1988). An alien corporation with such an alter ego subjects
itself to personal jurisdiction wherever it is deemed to be doing business. See infra note 30.
12. Alan D. Rosenthal, Venue and Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations in Patent
and Trademark Suits, 1980 PAT. L. ANN. 147, 147 (1980) ("Often, any relief obtained in a suit
which does not include the foreign manufacturer proves to be disappointing, for the foreign
manufacturer, Hydra-like, will locate new local distributors.").
13. Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 729, 179 U.S.P.Q. 486,
490 (D, Utah 1973); Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 147.
14. See Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 134 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (no single venue
proper for all distributor-defendants). Although an amendment to the general statute, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West Supp. 1991), as interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614
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the only defendant available to make a lawsuit economically feasible
because the alien manufacturer would almost always be liable for the
most damages. This holds true especially where a large number of
distributors have each made a small percentage of the total sales. Jurisdictional barriers to suing aliens, therefore, interfere with congressional efforts to protect U.S. patent holders from foreign infringers and
create incentives for alien companies to manufacture infringing products overseas.
This Note examines current approaches to the question of personal
jurisdiction over alien patent infringers. Part I describes personal jurisdiction requirements in the context of patent infringement suits
against aliens. The leading case addressing these requirements has
been interpreted differently by several courts, thus resulting in conflicting outcomes. Part II explains the current controversy over the locus
of the tort of patent infringement. The three different modes of reasoning currently used by courts to determine the locus of the tort
would allow immunity from suit for the alien in at least two hypothetical cases. This Part concludes that in order to prevent the possibility
of immunity in such situations, the courts should carefully choose and
apply the same approach to the locus of the tortious injury. Part III
examines the theories behind two competing approaches to the locus
of the tortious injury and argues for the uniform adoption of a single
rule. This Note concludes that courts should deem the tort to occur
where the distributor made the infringing sales.

I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN lNFRINGERS
Anyone other than the patent holder who "makes, uses, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States ... infringes the patent." 15 This type of infringement is called direct infringement. 16
Although an alien corporation that sells its product to distributors
outside of the territorial United States cannot be guilty of direct in-

(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991), eased venue restrictions somewhat, the
problem of joining all distributors in a single action persists. Johnson Gas held that a 1988
amendment to 28 U.S.C.A. § 139l(c) (Supp. 1991) applies to the term "reside" as the term is
used in the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988). Under this decision, venue is
proper in a patent infringement case involving a defendant corporation wherever that corpora·
tion is subject to personal jurisdiction, thus creating more possible venues in most cases involving
corporate defendants. Yet because one can easily imagine a case where multiple distributors
would not all be subject to personal jurisdiction in the same district, the venue problem remains.
In addition, this statute only affects venue for corporations; venue for individuals remains
unaffected.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
16. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 522-25, 173 U.S.P.Q. 769,
771-72 (1972) (discussing the concepts of direct, induced, and contributory infringement).
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fringement, 17 it may be held liable for inducing infringement18 in such
a case. 19 As noted by Professor Chisum, one commits inducement by
"actively and knowingly aiding and abetting another's direct infringement of a patent."20 Both types of patent infringement actions must
satisfy the three jurisdictional requirements applicable to any federal
lawsuit: venue, subject matter jurisdiction, and personaljurisdiction.21
Aliens usually do not contest venue or subject matter jurisdiction.
Venue is proper in any federal district in a patent infringement suit
against an alien, 22 and the federal district courts have original subject
matter jurisdiction over all patent actions. 23 The personal jurisdiction
requirement, however, is a much-contested legal barrier. Section I.A
describes the problem of obtaining personal jurisdiction over an alien
patent infringer. Section I.B then explains the leading case addressing
the personal jurisdiction question, from which two competing theories
as to the locus of the tortious injury emerge.

17. See Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 525-31, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 772-74 (holding that it is
not an infringement of a patent to make, use, or sell a patented product outside of the United
States because Congress did not intend the patent infringement statute to have extraterritorial
effect).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1988) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.").
19. E.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1485, 1488, 225
U.S.P.Q. 929, 931 (D. Del. 1985). Direct infringement must occur in the United States before an
action for inducement can be brought. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509
F.2d 1137, 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387, 390 (7th Cir. 1975) (" '[A)ctive inducement' may be found in
events outside the United States if they result in a direct infringement here."); Deepsouth Packing
Co., 406 U.S. at 526, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 772 (stating that there can be no contributory infringement
without direct infringement). At least one decision suggests that when the alien knows the infringing product will reach the United States, the alien is guilty of inducement of infringement.
Keams v. Wood Motors Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
20. 4 DONALDS. CHISUM, PATENTS§ 17.04, at 17-44.2 (1991).
21. JONATHON M. LANDERS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 3-11 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the
jurisdictional requirements applicable to any federal lawsuit).
22. Venue in patent infringement suits is normally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988),
which allows an action to commence where the defendant resides or where the defendant does
business, provided acts of infringement occurred there. The Supreme Court previously held that
"28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement
actions ...." Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229, 113 U.S.P.Q.
234, 237 (1957). Strict adherence to this holding, however, would immunize most aliens from
suit for patent infringement because most alien infringers do not do business in the United States.
See Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 710, 174 U.S.P.Q. 1, 3-4 (1972)
(holding that application of the patent venue statute to alien defendants would deprive the court
of jurisdiction granted by Congress). The Supreme Court therefore modified its original holding
to allow the more general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 139l(d) (1988), to govern patent infringement suits against an alien. Brunette Mach. Works, 406 U.S. at 714, 174 U.S.P.Q. at 4. Under
this statute, an alien may be sued in any federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 139I(d) (1988).
Therefore, in a patent infringement suit against an alien, venue is proper in any district court.
Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 148 ("[T)here are no venue considerations with respect to alien
corporations.").
23. 28 u.s.c. § 1338 (1988).
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A. Personal Jurisdiction
When a patent holder sues an alien for patent infringement, obtaining personal jurisdiction over the alien is the primary jurisdictional
barrier.24 Federal courts must follow traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrine in such cases. 25 A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant when two requirements are met: (1) a statute
must authorize service of process26 and (2) the defendant must have
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' " 27 In patent cases, because no federal statute authorizing service of process exists, service must be made under the
long-arm statute of the state in which the federal court sits. 28 Federal
courts must apply the statute in the same manner state courts would
apply it. 29
Typical long-arm statutes provide for jurisdiction over any party
who commits a tort within the state. 30 To apply these statutes, courts
must determine the legal situs of the tort. Because patent infringement is a tort, 31 a court ordinarily obtains personal jurisdiction over
24. Rita M. Irani, Jurisdiction and Venue in Patent Cases: Effect of the Federal Circuit on
Construction ofthe Patent Venue Statute, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SocY. 445, 445 (1987);
Neagley, supra note 11, at 713.
25. See, e.g.. Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 134 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (stating requirements for personal jurisdiction in a patent infringement case).
26. Omni Capital Intl. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
27. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (If no federal rule exists, then service may "be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the [state] statute or rule."); Omni Capital Intl. v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 101-04 (1987). As one commentator has written, "[t]he term
'long-arm statute' refers to state statutes which confer upon state courts personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendants who do business in the state or commit any of a series of enumerated
acts either within the state or outside the state with consequences in-state." Jon Heller, Note,
Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service ofProcess, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 113, 113 n.7
(1989). For an example of a court asserting jurisdiction over a patent infringement defendant
under a long-arm statute, see Graham Eng. Corp. v. Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 195
U.S.P.Q. 267 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
29. LANDERS ET AL, supra note 21, at 127; see Omni Capital Intl. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484
U.S. 97, 101-04 (1987).
30. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, ~ 2-209 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 600.715 (1979);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302 (McKinney 1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 17.042
(West 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 1977). These statutes typically also provide for
jurisdiction over any corporation doing business in the state. In a patent infringement suit
against an alien, jurisdiction under a "doing business" provision is atypical and uninteresting.
Normally, an alien is only deemed to be doing business when it has an alter ego in the United
States. In this rare circumstance, the court can take jurisdiction over the alien under the doing
business provision of the long-arm statute. See supra note 11.
31. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387, 390 (7th Cir. 1975);
Keams v. Wood Motors Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 488 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Engineered Sports
Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 726, 179 U.S.P.Q. 486, 488 (D. Utah 1973); Rosen·
thal, supra note 12, at ISO; Neagley, supra note 11, at 715.
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the alien defendant under such a long-arm provision. 32 Courts have
also determined that inducement of infringement is a tort because inducement essentially requires "aiding and abetting" the direct infringer. 33 Because they consider inducement to be an integral part of
the corresponding direct infringement, courts deem both torts to have
been committed at the place of the direct infringement. 34 Consequently, federal courts may use a tort long-arm provision to reach
alien infringers, because the acts of inducement need not occur in the
United States. 35 Although the above principles are well established,
determining the location of the direct infringement tort remains a difficult issue.

B. The Root of the Controversy - Honeywell v. Metz
Apparatewerke
The leading appellate case upholding long-arm jurisdiction over an
alien infringer is Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke. 36 Honeywell's importance lies in the court's discussion of the situs of the tort of
patent infringement. In this case, the alien defendant's U.S. distributor sold infringing goods in Illinois. The state long-arm statute provided for jurisdiction over one who commits "a tortious act within
[Illinois]." 37 Illinois courts interpreted this statute to mean that "the
situs of the tort is the place where the injury occurs. " 38 The appellate
court in Honeywell held that the infringement Honeywell alleged was a
tortious act committed within Illinois, consonant with the meaning of
the state long-arm statute. 39 Consequently, the court concluded that
Honeywell had suffered tortious injury in Illinois. This section discusses the implications of this case.
Honeywell brought suit against Metz, the manufacturer; two U.S.
distributors; and a U.S. retailer for infringing its patent on a photographic flash unit. 40 Metz sold its flash units F.O.B.41 a "German seaport or German border" to the U.S. distributors. 42 Metz also
32. E.g., Honeywell, 509 F.2d at 1141-42, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390-91.
33. Honeywell, 509 F.2d at 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390; Kearns 204 U.S.P.Q. at 489; Engineered Sports Prods., 362 F. Supp. at 727, 179 U.S.P.Q. at 489; see also Neagley, supra note 11, at
715.
34. See Honeywell, 509 F.2d at 1142, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 391.
35. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
36. 509 F.2d 1137, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387 (7th Cir. 1975); see 6 CHISUM, supra note 20,
§ 21.02[3], at 21-104 (Honeywell is a "leading decision.").
37. 509 F.2d at 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390.
38. 509 F.2d at 1142, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390.
39. 509 F.2d at 1142, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 391.
40. 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 388.
41. F.O.B. (free on board) refers to the location where title to goods passes from the seller to
the buyer. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 642 (6th ed. 1990); see u.c.c. § 2-319(1) (1977).
42. 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 389.
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promised to indemnify its distributor for any damages due to patent
infringement. 43 Honeywell filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois because the retailer and one distributor sold a significant number
of Metz products there. 44 The district court dismissed the suit against
Metz for want of personal jurisdiction.4 s Honeywell appealed, claiming that jurisdiction was proper under the tortious act provision of the
Illinois long-arm statute. 46 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
jurisdiction over Metz was proper in light of the requirements of both
the long-arm statute and due process.47 The court of appeals held that
Honeywell had indeed suffered tortious injury in Illinois. Therefore,
Metz's infringement constituted a tortious act committed in Illinois.
This holding lends itself to two possible interpretations. First, the
court may have meant that the injury occurred where infringing sales
were made because such sales caused tortious injury at the place of the
sale. In support of this interpretation, the court's discussion of patent
infringement referred to an earlier decision which suggested that infringing a patent in Illinois constitutes a tortious act in that state.48 In
this context, the Honeywell court noted that distributors of Metz products made infringing sales in the state.49 Alternatively, the court may
have meant that the injury occurred where the patent owner resides
because the patent owner suffered economic harm and damage to her
intellectual property rights there. The court's analysis of due process
requirements supports this position. Here, the court noted that in-fringement caused injury to Honeywell, which had its principal place
of business in Illinois. so
At least one leading commentator noted that Honeywell left the
issue of where the tort of patent infringement occurs "implicitly or
explicitly" unresolved.s 1 Both interpretations of Honeywell are plausible, as demonstrated by the competing constructions made by district
courts.s2 Although Honeywell created a two-way federal split of authority over the situs of patent infringement, some federal courts must
follow a third approach due to substantive variations among state
43. 509 F.2d at 1140, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 389.
44. See 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 388.
45. 509 F.2d at 1140-41, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 389.
46. 509 F.2d at 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 389-90. The Illinois long-arm statute has been recently
amended and the paragraph number of the current statute has changed since 1975. The current
provision, identical to that applied in Honeywell, is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, ~ 2-209(2) (1990).
47. 509 F.2d at 1141-45, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390-92.
48. 509 F.2d at 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390.
49. 509 F.2d at 1141-42, 1144, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390, 392.
50. 509 F.2d at 1144, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 392.
51. 6 CHISUM, supra note 20, § 21.02[3), at 21-105.
52. Compare Acrison Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (interpreting Honeywell to mean that the injury occurs where the patent
owner resides) with Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (interpreting Honeywell to mean that the injury occurs where infringing sales are made).
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long-arm statutes. Some states have chosen the place of the tortious
act as the situs of the tort, thereby making the place of infringing sales
the situs of the tort of patent infringement.
The question of whether states should focus on the tortious act or
tortious injury to determine the situs of the tort is beyond the scope of
this Note. This question only arises because different states interpret
their long-arm statutes in different ways. Because federal courts must
apply state long-arm statutes as interpreted by state courts, 53 federal
courts cannot resolve this question. Furthermore, a new interpretation of a long-arm statute has broad implications for all tort actions,
extending far beyond the narrow question of which interpretation is
proper for patent infringement. As a practical matter, resolving this
question may be impossible. Proper resolution of the split of authority
created by Honeywell, however, may dispense with the need to resolve
this issue.
This Note argues that the Honeywell split should be resolved in
favor of locating the irljury of patent infringement where infringing
sales are made. This conclusion renders the question of whether states
should focus on the tortious act or tortious injury moot, because,
under the suggested resolution of the Honeywell split, both the act and
injury are deemed to occur at the same place - the place of the infringing sales. 54 In addition, resolution of the Honeywell split would
provide a uniform outcome with no additional implications beyond the
narrow scope of patent infringement. Thus, the problem created by
the Honeywell split can be resolved by focusing judicial inquiry on the
true situs of the injury in a patent infringement action.
II.

THREE VARYING APPROACHES TO DETERMINING THE SITUS
OF THE TORT

The Honeywell court necessarily focused on where the plaintiff had
suffered tortious injury, because, under the Illinois long-arm statute,
the situs of the tort is the place where the tortious injury occurred.
However, some states have interpreted their long-arm statutes differently, considering the situs of the tort to be the place where the tortious act occurred. 55 As noted above, federal courts are bound to
follow states' interpretations of their long-arm statutes, even in the
context of a federal cause of action such as patent infringement. 56
53. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
54. Section 111.C.3 of this Note argues that this outcome provides one practical reason for
resolving the Honeywell split in this manner. Federal courts may resolve this split because there
is no state authority as to where the injury of patent infringement occurs. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (1988), the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement suits.
Therefore, the split of authority over the situs of the tortious injury is purely federal.
55. E.g., Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 135-36 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
56. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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When states interpret the long-arm statute to focus on the tortious act,
the situs of the tort is where the infringing sales were made. 57
Although this result is consistent with the first interpretation of Honeywell, the path to the result differs. Therefore, three conflicting rules
currently govern the situs of the tort of patent infringement.
Sections II.A, 11.B, and 11.C of this Part present the three competing theories of where the tort occurs: the "Injury at Place of Patent"
rule, the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule, and the "Act of
Infringement" rule. The first two approaches, which result from the
conflicting interpretations of the Honeywell case, concentrate on the
locus of the tortious injury due to the underlying state long-arm statute's substantive focus on the tortious injury. The third approach concentrates on the locus of the tortious act due to the underlying state
long-arm statute's substantive focus on the tortious act. Section 11.D
illustrates the difficulties which can arise when the three methods of
analysis are applied under various state long-arm provisions.
A.

The ''Injury at Place of Patent" Approach

Federal courts that must determine the situs of a tort by focusing
on where the plaintiff suffers injury can adopt either of the two alternative interpretations of Honeywell. The first, the "Injury at Place of
Patent" rule, allows a court to obtain personal jurisdiction in the district whe(e the patent holder resides. 58
A paradigmatic case59 of alien infringement, Acrison, Inc. v. Control and Metering Ltd., 60 illustrates this mode of reasoning. In Acrison, the patent holder, Acrison, Inc., brought suit against Brabender
Technologie KG, a German corporation; its Canadian distributor,
Control and Metering Limited (CML); and Control and Metering,
Inc.(CMI), CML's U.S. subsidiary. 61 Acrison sued in Illinois because
CMI had an established place of business there. Acrison neither did
business in Illinois, nor was incorporated there. 62 Brabender delivered
the infringing products to CML F.O.B. Germany. 63 TheAcrison court
held that it did not have jurisdiction over Brabender because Acrison's
tortious injury did not occur in Illinois. 64 The court implicitly recognized that a patent constitutes an intangible property interest created
57. See, e.g., Huche/, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 135-36; see also infra section II.C.
58. See, e.g., Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448-49, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 1836 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
60. 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
61. 730 F. Supp. at 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1833-34.
62. 730 F. Supp. at 1448, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836.
63. 730 F. Supp. at 1446, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1834. For a definition of F.O.B., see supra note
41.
64. 730 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836.
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by federal law, 65 with a necessarily fictional situs.
Courts following the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule consider the
residence of the owner as the most appropriate situs of this interest. 66
Consequently, the Acrison court held that Acrison suffered tortious
injury to its intangible property rights at the corporation's residence,
the fictional situs of the property, 67 as well as economic harm which
had its impact at the residence. 68 Although the Acrison court characterized both injuries as occurring at the residence of the patent holder,
these injuries may be viewed with equal plausibility as occurring where
infringing sales are made.

B. The ''Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" Approach
The second rule arising out of the Honeywell split, the "Injury at
Place of Infringing Sales" approach, dictates that a court may assert
personal jurisdiction where the defendant made infringing sales because the patent owner suffers harm there. 69 Interface Biomedical
Laboratories v. Axiom Medical, Inc. 70 illustrates this method of reasoning. Here, the patent holder, Interface, brought a patent infringement suit in the Eastern District of New York against Axiom, a
California corporation. 71 Although Axiom had not sold infringing
products in New York, 72 Interface argued that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Axiom because Interface, a New York
corporation, suffered both economic injury and damage to its intellectual property rights there. 73 The Interface court disagreed, reasoning
that economic injury occurs where sales are lost, 74 and that intangible
property has no jurisdictional significance.75 Although the Interface
court refused to attribute jurisdictional significance to the intangible,
65. Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255, 259, 217 U.S.P.Q. 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1982).
66. E.g., Horne, 684 F.2d at 259, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 19; Acrison, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 1448, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836 (damage to intellectual property takes place where the owner resides).
67. For another example of a court focusing on the patent owner's residence as the situs of
the patent, see Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 299 n. 12, 226 U.S.P.Q. 305, 31112 n.12 (3d Cir. 1985).
68. Acrison, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836.
69. See, e.g., Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1303, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36, 37
(E.D. Mich. 1976).
70. 600 F. Supp. 731, 225 U.S.P.Q. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
71. 600 F. Supp. at 732-33, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 146. Although Axiom is a California corporation, the court's personal jurisdiction analysis under the New York long-arm statute would apply
if Axiom were an alien.
72. 600 F. Supp. at 740, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 152.
73. 600 F. Supp. at 738, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 151.
74. 600 F. Supp. at 738-39, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 151-52.
75. 600 F. Supp. at 740, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 152. By "no jurisdictional significance," the Interface court apparently meant one cannot focus on the location of a patent for jurisdictional purposes because, unlike real property, the location of intangible property is impossible to
determine. This holding is a broad reading of Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
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other courts following the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule
have done so. 76 Unlike courts following the "Injury at Place of Patent" theory, however, these courts deem the intellectual property injury to be an invasion of rights which occurs "where the infringing
article is sold or used. "77
C.

The "Act of Infringement" Approach

In contrast to the "Injury at Place of Patent" and "Injury at Place
of Infringing Sales" theories, the "Act of Infringement" rule abandons
the focus on where the tortious injury occurs and instead concentrates
on where the defendant committed the tortious act. Some state courts
will exercise jurisdiction under the tort provision of their long-arm
statute only if the tortious act occurs within the state, regardless of
where the injury occurs. 78 In the context of patent infringement, sales
of infringing products constitute the relevant tortious act. 79 However,
in the paradigmatic case, the alien has not committed direct infringement. 80 At least one court faced with this situation has upheld jurisdiction over the alien, reasoning that the alien defendant's involvement
in the acts of infringement suffices to constitute a tortious act in the
jurisdiction. 81 Implicit in this reasoning is that the alien could be
found liable for inducing infringement, which is a tort deemed to occur where infringing sales are made. 82 Note that the "Act oflnfringement" mode of reasoning produces results consistent with the "Injury
at Place of Infringing Sales" rule, but by a different rationale.

D. Significance of the Varying Approaches
Every state has some type of long-arm statute. 83 Whether directly
76. E.g., Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 488 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (acknowledging that infringement affects a patent owner's rights and citing two decisions that consider
this injury to occur where infringing sales occur); Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F.
Supp. 1302, 1303, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36, 37 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (acknowledging that the invasion of a
patent owner's rights occurs where the infringing good is sold or used).
77. Amburn, 423 F. Supp. at 1303, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 37.
78. See, e.g., Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 135-36 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
79. See Huche/, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 135-36. The statutory reference to anyone who "makes, uses
or sells" a patented device, 28 U.S.C. § 27l(a) (1988), gives rise to the argument that the tortious
act occurs where the infringer manufactures the infringing device. In the paradigmatic case,
however, an alien infringer manufactures the device outside the United States. Because aliens
cannot be guilty of direct infringement for acts committed outside the United States, see supra
note 17 and accompanying text, the tortious act of the manufacturer is not jurisdictionally significant. As previously noted, the plaintiff must sue the alien for inducement of infringement. See
supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. Inducement, in this context, constitutes aiding and
abetting the direct infringer. Thus, the relevant tortious act is the infringing sale.
80. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
81. Huche/, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 135-36.
82. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
83. ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (1991); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-4-101 (Michie 1987); CAL.
C1v. PROC. CODE§ 410.10 (Deering 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (1987); CONN. GEN.
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or indirectly, these statutes allow a state to exercise jurisdiction over
one who commits a tort within the state. However, what constitutes a
"tort within the state" varies with each state's interpretation of its statute; even similarly worded statutes have been interpreted differently.
As a consequence, either the varying state interpretations, or the Honeywell split of authority over the locus of the patent infringement injury may permit an alien patent infringer to gain immunity from
suit. 84
Two hypothetical examples illustrate the problem of unintended
immunity. Assume that a U.S. distributor sells - in significant quanties and only in Illinois - a paradigmatic85 alien's product infringing
on a Texas corporation's patent. As noted above, the Northern District of Illinois follows the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule, reasoning
that the tortious injury of patent infringement occurs where the owner
resides, in this case Texas. 86 In contrast, the Southern District of
Texas follows the "Act of Infringemenf' approach, reasoning that the
tortious act of infringement takes place where the infringer makes the
sales, in this case Illinois. 87 In this hypothetical, the district court will
dismiss the action no matter where the plaintiff sues. The federal district court in Illinois, bound to focus on the injury, will consider the
injury (and the tort) to have occurred in Texas, where the patent
owner resides. The federal district court in Texas, necessarily focusing
on the act of infringement, will deem the tort to have occurred in Illinois, where the defendant made infringing sales. In this hypothetical,
the alien infringer is immune from suit.
As a second hypothetical, assume that the patent holder resides in
STAT. § 52-59b (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 48.193 (Harrison 1988); GA. CooE ANN.§ 9-10-91 (Michie Supp. 199); HAW. REv.
STAT. § 634-35 (1985); IDAHO CoDE § 5-514 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, ~ 2-209 (1989);
IOWA CoDE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (1983); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201
(West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (1980); Mo. Crs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN.
6-103 (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 223A, § 3 (1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.705, 600.715
(1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West 1988); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1991);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.500 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-20-4B (1990); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 510:4
(Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (1987); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302 (McKinney
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004 (West Supp. 1990);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (1981); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-803 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 15-7-2 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-214 (Supp. 1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CoDE ANN. § 17.042 (West 1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. 78-27-24 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-328.1 (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §4.28.185 (West 1988); W. VA.
CODE§ 56-3-33 (Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT.§ 801.05 (1977); WYO. STAT.§ 5-1-107 (1990); ALA.
R. CIV. P. 4.2; ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2); IND. R. TRIAL P. 4.4; N.J. CIV. PRACT. R. 4:4-4; N.D.
R. C1v. P. 4(b); OHIO R. C1v. P. 4.3; OR. R. C1v. P. 4.
84. For a discussion of the split of authority see notes 51-54 and accompanying text, supra.
85. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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the Southern District of New York and, as above, infringing sales have
been made exclusively in Illinois. The Southern District of New York
follows the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule. 88 New York's
approach is distinguished from the Texas approach in that New York
focuses on where the injury occurs, while Texas focuses on where the
tortious act occurs. Application of these two modes of reasoning,
however, produces identical results, because New York federal courts
consider the patent holder to have sustained injury where the defendant made infringing sales. The result of a patent infringement suit
against the alien will be the same in this hypothetical as in the previous
one - immunity from suit for the alien. Again, the Illinois district
court will dismiss the suit because the patent owner does not reside in
Illinois. The New York district court, bound to focus on the injury,
will dismiss the suit because it considers the injury to have occurred in
Illinois where the defendant made infringing sales.
These hypotheticals illustrate how the combination of the Honeywell split and the different substantive foci of state long-arm statutes
create a jurisdictional "gap," leaving some alien infringers immune
from suit. The potential for such immunity provides a strong impetus
for choosing a uniform rule. These hypotheticals also illustrate that,
for the ultimate determination of whether an alien is subject to personal jurisdiction, no practical difference exists between the "Act of
Infringement" and the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" approaches. As will be explained fully below, this factor provides one
strong reason to adopt the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" approach. Even if courts resolve the Honeywell split, therefore, in favor
of uniform adoption of the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule, immunity
is still possible because some federal courts must still focus on the tortious act.
III.

THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLACE OF INFRINGING
SALES APPROACH

The second hypothetical examined in Part II illustrates the need
for a uniform view of where the injury from patent infringement occurs. Without a uniform definition, alien infringers may be able to
evade the patent laws because they are immune from suit. This Part
examines the reasoning underlying the two theories of the situs of the
patent infringement injury. Section III.A discusses the nature of the
injury to the patent owner's intellectual property rights and section
III.B discusses the nature of the economic injury to the patent owner.
Both sections conclude that the reasoning behind the "Injury at Place
of Infringing Sales" approach is superior to the reasoning underlying
the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach. Section III.C demonstrates
88. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
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that significant problems would remain under uniform adoption of the
"Injury at Place of Patent" rule. The "Injury at Place of Infringing
Sales" approach, by comparison, would not suffer from these deficiencies if uniformly adopted.
A.

The Situs of the Injury to the Owner's Patent Rights

The first injury courts acknowledge in alien infringement cases is
the injury to the patent holder's intellectual property rights. Courts
that have addressed the question of where the injury to a patent
holder's intellectual property rights occurs normally have offered little
analysis of this issue. Rather, courts on both sides of the issue tend to
make conclusory statements about the locus of the tort. 89 This section
demonstrates that harm to a patent holder's rights actually occurs
where infringing sales are made.
In Rush v. Savchuk, 90 the Supreme Court noted, in the context of a
garnishment action, that intangible property has no actual situs and
can have no jurisdictional significance. 91 Although applying this language to all forms of intangible property requires a broad reading of
the Court's holding, at least one court has followed this holding in the
context of patent infringement. 92 On this basis, the location of the
harm to the patent owner's intangible property rights would be irrelevant for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. If this argument is accepted, the analysis of where the injury occurs would necessarily focus
on economic injury. 93 However, because other courts facing the place
of injury issue do not appear to have accepted such a broad interpretation, the nature of the injury to the owner's intellectual property rights
must also be examined.94
On its face, the reasoning behind the "Injury at Place of Patent"
rule is appealing. Patent infringement causes an injury to the patent
owner's intangible property right. 95 The injury to that property right
should be assigned a legal situs; the residence of the owner is a plausi89. See, e.g., Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1303, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36, 37
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (The invasion of the patent owner's rights "would occur where the infringing
article is sold or used or where infringement is induced."); Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering
Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 1836 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Damage to intellectual property rights ... by definition takes place where the owner suffers the damage."). Not
only is the statement by the Acrison court conclusory, the reasoning is circular. The court was
trying to determine where the owner suffers the damage.
90. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
91. 444 U.S. at 330.
92. Interface Biomedical Lab. v. Axiom Medical, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 731, 740, 225 U.S.P.Q.
146, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Rush, 444 U.S. at 328-30).
93. See infra section III.B.
94. See, e.g., Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
95. See supra notes 67 & 76 and accompanying text. The patent owner's right to exclude
others is damaged by infringement. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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ble place. Upon closer examination, however, this approach has a
number of flaws, both in its application and in the way it characterizes
a patent owner's rights.
First, the state of a corporation's residence may be unclear; the
corporation's principal place of business, its state of incorporation, or
the place of patent assignment are all reasonable choices. The Acrison
court observed that in Honeywell, the plaintiff was an Illinois corporation that suffered harm in Illinois. 96 In actuality, although Honeywell
had its principal place of business in Illinois, 97 it was incorporated in
Delaware.9 8 Apparently, the Acrison court felt the situs of the patent
should be in the state of incorporation, while the Honeywell court felt
the proper situs was the corporation's principal place of business. A
third possibility also exists - the state of the patent assignment. Because the patent at issue in Honeywell was assigned to "Honeywell[,]
Inc., Minneapolis, Minn., a corporation of Delaware.," 99 Minnesota
might be deemed the situs of the patent. If Honeywell produced its
patented goods exclusively in Minneapolis, then Minnesota constitutes
a reasonable choice for the patent's situs because infringement would
presumably affect this Honeywell plant most directly. As each of
these locations present reasonable choices, adoption of the "Injury at
Place of Patent" mode of analysis might still result in a secondary split
of authority over the situs of the patent. Indeed, given the varying foci
of the Acrison and Honeywell courts, such a split may already exist.
Second, the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule makes the questionable assumption that a patent has a situs. To the contrary, a patent is a
federally created right, valid throughout the United States. 100 Given
its national reach, two possible characterizations can be made of the
patent grant, both of which reject the "Injury at Place of Patent"
mode of reasoning. The first possibility is that because patent rights
exist throughout the United States, arguably no identifiable situs exists. This characterization is a variation of the Supreme Court's analysis in Rush v. Savchuk. 101 Under this characterization, the situs of the
patent has no jurisdictional significance. An alternative characterization is that the patent holder has an intangible property right in every
federal district in the United States. 102 Because infringement damages
96. Acrison, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836 (citing Honeywell, Inc. v.
Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1144, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1975)).
97. Honeywell, Inc., 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 388.
98. Honeywell, Inc., 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 388.
99. U.S. Patent No. RE 26,999 (Dec. 8, 1970); U.S. Patent No. 3,340,426 (Sept. 5, 1967).
100. 35 u.s.c. § 154 (1988).
101. 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980). This is a broad interpretation of Rush. Although Rush in·
volved garnishment of an insurance policy, an area unrelated to intellectual property, at least one
court has so interpreted the decision. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
102. This characterization is similar to that of the injury in a libel case. A person's reputn·
tion may be damaged in any jurisdiction where the libel is published. Keeton v. Hustler Maga·
zine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984). In essence, then, a person has personalty rights in their
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a different piece of the patent owner's intangible property in each district where infringing sales are made, the patent owner would, under
this interpretation, obtain different causes of action for infringement in
each district. This characterization supports the "Injury at Place of
Infringing Sales" approach, as the patent owner obtains separate
causes of action wherever infringing products are sold.
Finally, the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule mischaracterizes the
nature of the patent owner's rights. A patent grants the owner a bundle of property rights. 103 The most important component of this bundle is the right to exclude others. 104 When infringement occurs, the
most important injury to the patent owner is infringement of her right
to exclude. Because infringement occurs at a specific place, the patent
owner arguably loses the right to exclude there. Infringement is somewhat analogous to trespassing. When one has trespassed on another's
property, the injury occurs where the right to exclude is lost, not
where the owner of the property resides. Consequently, the "Injury at
Place of Infringing Sales" approach more correctly identifies the place
of damage to the patent owner's property rights.
This characterization of the patent owner's injury suggests that the
split of authority over where the injury occurs should be resolved in
favor of the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule. The "Injury at
Place of Patent" approach characterizes the injury of patent infringement in a conclusory fashion as an injury to intangible property without examining the true nature of the injury. Because the patent owner
truly loses the right to exclude where infringement occurs, the "Injury
at Place of Infringing Sales" method of reasoning better characterizes
the injury to the patent owner's intangible property rights.
B.

The Situs of the Owner's Economic Injury

The second injury that courts focus on to determine where the injury occurs is economic harm to the patent holder. The "Injury at
Place of Patent" method of analysis posits that economic harm occurs
at the residence of the patent holder because the patent owner suffers
reputation in every state. At least one court has noted that intangible intellectual property rights
are similar to personalty rights, such as reputation. Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd.,
730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448 n.7, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 1836 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Suprisingly, application of the above reasoning would contradict the Acrison court's holding; it is unclear why the
court chose to make this analogy.
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
104. The right to exclude others is the essence of the human right called "property." The
right to exclude others from free use of an invention protected by a valid patent does not
differ from the right to exclude others from free use of one's automobile, crops, or other
items of personal property.... That one human property right may be challenged by trespass, another by theft, and another by infringement, does not affect the fundamental indicium of all "property," i.e., the right to exclude others.
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 n.5, 197 U.S.P.Q. 726, 731
n.5 (6th Cir. 1978).
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the impact of the economic loss there. 105 The "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" mode of reasoning maintains that the harm occurs
where the infringing sales occur because the patent owner loses sales
there. 106 This section argues that the "Injury at Place of Infringing
Sales" approach better identifies the actual situs of the economic
injury.
Courts adopting the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule often flatly
state, without explanation, that the economic injury to the patent
holder occurs at his place of residence. 107 These conclusory statements probably result from an intuitive sense that the patent owner
suffered economic harm, affecting his income where he resides. On its
face, this analysis appeals to common sense, but closer scrutiny reveals
several flaws in this approach. First, as shown in section III.A, identifying the residence of the patent owner may prove diffi.cult. 108
Second, many courts have determined that economic loss occurs
where infringing sales are made because the patent owner loses business there. 109 Arguably, the patent owner loses not just sales, but also
goodwill in the jurisdiction. 110 Purchasers of the infringing product
will give credit for the patented innovation to the infringer, rather
than the patent holder. The patent holder also loses the benefit of
greater name recognition where the infringing sales are made. The
combination of losing potential customers and decreased name recognition can lead to a loss of future sales - a potentially serious economic injury. The patent owner, therefore, actually suffers injury
where infringing sales are made.
Indeed, courts have followed this reasoning in other areas of intellectual property. Courts have determined that trademark infringement occurs where infringing sales are made. 111 In these cases, courts
focus on both the economic loss from lost sales and the loss of goodwill suffered by the holder of the trademark. 112 Both injuries are
105. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
107. Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833,
1836 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Infringement "has its economic impact on Acrison outside of Illinois.").
108. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. The identification of the residence of the
patent owner is problematic in the interpretation of the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach for
determining both where the patent owner's intangible property is located and where the patent
owner suffers economic harm.
109. Interface Biomedical Lab. v. Axiom Medical, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 731, 738-40, 225
U.S.P.Q. 146, 151-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
110. See Standard Mailing Machs. Co. v. Ditto, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 228, 47 U.S.P.Q. IO (D.
Mass. 1940) (corporation's goodwill built up by infringing plaintiff's patent); Motor Improvements, Inc. v. A.C. Spark Plug Co., 5 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Mich. 1934) (corporations acquired
"good will of great value" due to the effectiveness of their product), revd. on other grounds, 80
F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1935). The argument in the text assumes the patent holder sells a product
covered by the patent.
111. la JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE§ 8.04 (1991).
112. Keds Corp. v. Renee Intl. Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 218, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810
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deemed to occur where the infringing sales are made. 113 A number of
courts follow this approach in copyright infringement actions as
we11.114

Third, applying the "Injury at Place of Patent" mode of reasoning
would have negative implications for other types of tortious injuries.
Most torts cause some type of economic injury. A consistent application of this approach would allow a state to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant merely because the defendant had caused some injury to a
resident of the state. 115 Only the fortuitous circumstance of the plaintiff's residence would connect the forum with the tort; a result which
likely violates the defendant's due process rights and could lead to forum shopping. 116 In order to prevent such a result, New York courts
have declared jurisdiction improper in ordinary tort cases under these
circumstances unless some injury would have occurred in New York
even if the plaintiff did not reside there. 117 This test distinguishes between cases where economic harm merely results from the tort and
where economic harm comprises an integral part of the tort itself. In
other words, an economic loss suffered by a state resident does not, in
and of itself, provide the state with a jurisdictional interest. Rather,
the economic loss must have resulted from some event which also occurred in the state. In patent infringement cases, then, economic harm
provides an illusory connection between the defendant and the plaintiff's residence and, consequently, should carry no jurisdictional
significance.
Fourth, the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule contradicts the minimum contacts inquiry 118· required to establish jurisdiction consonant
with the requirements of due process. Instead of focusing on where
the defendant has caused economic harm, the "Injury at Place of Patent" theory focuses only on the fact that the plaintiff has suffered economic loss. Asserting jurisdiction under such an approach would
justify assertions of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the
(1st Cir. 1989). It is important to keep these analogies in perspective, as trademark and copyright infringement cause injuries to the owners of the intellectual property that are slightly different from those caused by patent infringement. "The antics of the clown are not the paces of the
cloistered cleric." Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
113. See Keds Corp., 888 F.2d at 218-19; Land-0-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 708
F.2d 1338, 1340-43, 219 U.S.P.Q. 281, 282-84 (8th Cir. 1983); Hertz Sys., Inc. v. Hervis Corp.,
549 F. Supp. 796, 220 U.S.P.Q. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
114. See, e.g., Arbitron Co. v. E.W. Scripps, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 400, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 854, 858, 213 U.S.P.Q. 540, 543-44 (N.D. Ga. 1981), revd. on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674
(11th Cir. 1983).
115. Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1309, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36, 41-42
(E.D. Mich. 1976).
116. Amburn, 423 F. Supp. at 1309, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 42.
117. See Interface Biomedical Lab. v. Axiom Medical, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 731, 738, 225
U.S.P.Q. 146, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
118. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff's contacts with the forum. In other words, it would substitute
the plaintiff's contacts with the forum, i.e., the plaintiff's place of residence, for the required minimum contacts of the defendant with the
forum. 119 As the Supreme Court noted, "[s]uch an approach is forbidden by International Shoe and its progeny." 120 The "Injury at Place of
Infringing Sales" approach maintains a proper focus on the defendant's contacts with the forum because the defendant's products were
sold in the forum state.
A patent owner suffers actual economic injury, both in terms of
lost sales and lost goodwill, where infringing sales are made. This
characterization harmonizes patent infringement with the current
treatment of trademark and copyright infringement. 121 In contrast,
the "Injury at Place of Patent" method of analysis is flawed because a
literal application of the economic harm facet of the approach would
lead courts to improperly assert jurisdiction in other common tort
suits. The "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule, therefore, better
characterizes the situs of the economic injury occurring to the patent
owner.
C.

The Failure of the ''Injury at Place of Patent" Approach
Under Uniform Adoption

As demonstrated in sections III.A and III.B, the reasoning underlying the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach has several defects, and
the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" approach more correctly
characterizes the patent owner's injury. This section shifts the focus
from the reasoning underlying the two approaches to practical
problems resulting from even a uniform application of the "Injury at
Place of Patent" rule. First, venue requirements may make joinder of
U.S. distributors with the alien infringer impossible under this theory.
Second, due process requirements alone could immunize an alien infringer under the "Injury at Place of Patent" method of analysis.
Third, because some federal courts must continue to follow the "Act
of Infringement" rule, 122 even consistent application of the "Injury at
Place of Patent" rule by the remaining jurisdictions will result in immunity for alien infringers in some cases. The "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" approach avoids these dilemmas. These problems are
fundamental, because even if every jurisdiction which must focus on
the situs of the tortious injury adopted the "Injury at Place of Patent"
rule, all three difficulties would remain. As this section argues, courts
should reject the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach both because of
119. Amburn, 423 F. Supp. at 1309, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 42.
120. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (citing International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
121. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
122. See supra section 11.C.
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the flawed reasoning behind it, and the quandaries that its application ·
creates.
1.

The Difficulty of Joining U.S. Distributors

The "Injury at Place of Patent" rule may prevent the patent owner
from obtaining full relief because venue restrictions may bar joinder of
any U.S. distributors as defendants in the patent owner's home district. In a patent infringement suit, venue is proper with respect to a
domestic distributor if (1) the defendant resides in the district, or
(2) the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business in the district. 123 Under the recent amendment of the general federal venue statute, as interpreted by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in VE Holding Corp. v.
Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 124 a corporate defendant is deemed to reside in any district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Because this decision greatly reduces the jurisdictional barrier
presented by venue requirements, this discussion assumes that any
U.S. distributor is a corporation. As previously discussed, the "Injury
at Place of Patent" approach maintains that in personam jurisdiction
over the alien defendant is proper only in the district where the patent
owner resides. A U.S. distributor could not be joined in the same suit
if it was not doing business, and if no infringing sales were made, in
the district where the patent owner resides because the action would
fail to meet venue requirements.
The case of Acrison, Inc. v. Control and Metering Ltd., 125 discussed
earlier, illustrates this problem. The U.S. distributor did not challenge
jurisdiction because it resided in the district. The court held that it
could not assert jurisdiction over the alien corporation, however, because the patent owner did not reside in the district. 126 If Acrison, a
New Jersey corporation, attempted to bring a new suit in New Jersey,
the court would likely have transferred venue as to the U.S. distributor
back to the Northern District of Illinois, the place of infringing sales,
unless infringing sales had been made in New Jersey. Venue requirements, then, may makejoinder of both the-alien infringer and any U.S.
distributor in the same action impossible under the "Injury at Place of
Patent" method of analysis.
The "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule avoids this problem.
At least one U.S. distributor could always be joined because the dis123. See supra note 22. The venue requirement of a regular and established place of business
is more stringent than the requirement that a corporation be doing busiitess in the state for
purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction under a state long arm statute. E.g.. Brunswick Corp.
v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 1424 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
124. 917 F. Supp. 1445, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315
(1991).
125. 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
126. Acrison, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836.
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tributor would be subject to personal jurisdiction wherever infringing
sales had been made, under either a tort provision or "doing-business"
provision of a state long-arm statute. Under the new statute as interpreted in VE Holding Corp., venue is proper as to the distributor wherever personal jurisdiction exists. 127 Even if only one distributor could
be joined, the patent owner could pursue a single suit by selecting the
home forum of the U.S. distributor that made the greatest number of
infringing sales. Overall, the plaintiff would have greater flexibility in
joining defendants under the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales"
mode of reasoning.
This result has obvious implications for judicial economy. To obtain full relief, a patent owner may have to bring two suits under the
"Injury at Place of Patent" approach. Besides further clogging the
dockets of the federal courts, the burden of multiple litigation creates
great hardship to a patent owner, especially if the patent owner is a
small business. The difficulty of joining U.S. distributors, therefore,
provides the first practical reason to reject the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach.
2. Immunizing Aliens Through Due Process Requirements

Due process requirements may have the effect of immunizing an
alien infringer from suit under the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule. If
no infringing sales have occurred within the district where the patent
owner resides, the alien may have no contacts with the forum. Without such minimum contacts, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant. 128 In such a case, the alien would be immune from suit 129
unless the court adopted the aggregate contacts theory. This controversial approach to due process minimum contacts in patent infringement cases considers the aggregate contacts of the alien defendant
with the United States as a whole, rather than with the forum itself. 130
The minority of courts which apply this theory deduce that because a
federal right is involved, a court does not violate principles of fairness
when it considers the defendant's aggregate contacts with the United
States because a defendant who infringes a federally created right
should reasonably expect to be amenable to suit in any federal
court. 131 Courts that reject this analysis note that jurisdiction would
127. VE Holding Corp.• 917 F. Supp. 1445, 16 U.S.P.Q. 1614; see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
129. See Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728, 179 U.S.P.Q.
486, 490 (D. Utah 1973); see also Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 291, 188
U.S.P.Q. 255, 258 (D. Conn. 1975).
130. Antonious v. Kamata-Ri Co., 204 U.S.P.Q. 110, 112 (D. Md. 1979); Cryomedics, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. at 290, 188 U.S.P.Q. at 258; Engineered Sports Products, 362 F. Supp. at 728, 179
U.S.P.Q. at 490.
131. See Cryomedics, Inc., 391 F. Supp. at 290, 188 U.S.P.Q. at 257-58.
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only be proper if Congress had provided for nationwide service of
process. 132
The "Injury at Place of Patent" rule would obviously not immunize an alien under the aggregate contacts theory. Under the more
common minimum contacts approach, however, the alien would normally have no contacts with the forum if no sales were made in the
forum district. 133 If an alien producer's U.S. distributor carefully
avoids selling infringing products in the patent owner's district of residence, traditional due process principles and the "Injury at Place of
Patent" method of analysis would immunize the alien manufacturer
from suit. Until the Supreme Court accepts the aggregate contacts
theory, immunity remains possible in a number of jurisdictions.
The "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule avoids this harsh
result. Where substantial infringing sales have been made, the alien is
held to have the requisite minimum contacts, even in the paradigmatic
case.134 Although small in number, contacts can become constitutionally significant when directly related to the cause of action. Some
cases therefore suggest that even a small number of sales in the forum
may be enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. 135 The due
process minimum contacts requirement thus provides the second practical reason to reject the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach.
3.

''Act of Infringement" Approach Immunity

Uniform adoption of the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule could
also immunize an alien defendant if the patent owner's state of residence focuses on the tortious act in determining the situs of the tort
under its long-arm statute. In such a state, the federal court, bound by
the state's interpretation of its long-arm statute, must follow the "Act
of Infringement" theory. As noted above, 136 some states focus their
long-arm inquiry solely on the tortious act, rather than on the tortious
injury. 137 The first hypothetical in section II.D demonstrated that an
alien could be immune from suit if its U.S. distributor did not make
sales in the patent owner's state of residence and that state followed
the "Act of Infringement" rule. 138 As long as the alien defendant
132. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 297, 226 U.S.P.Q. 305, 310 (3d. Cir.
1985).
133. See, e.g., Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36 (E.D.
Mich. 1976).
134. Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 490-91 (E.D. Mich. 1978); see note 11
and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 136 (S.D. Tex. 1980); see also la
GILSON, supra note 111, at§ 8.04 (U.S. Supreme Court decision in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), may have set a lower threshold for obtaining jurisdiction.).
136. See supra section II.C.
137. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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failed to sell infringing products in any federal district adhering to the
"Act of Infringement" approach, a district court would dismiss the
suit no matter where it was brought.
As a result, even if every district court which must focus on the
place of tortious injury were to adopt the "Injury at Place of Patent"
mode of reasoning as to where the injury of patent infringement occurs, some defendants would remain immune from suit because some
states will continue to focus on where the tortious act occurs. Because
federal courts cannot dictate uniform interpretation of state long-arm
statutes, 139 this problem will likely persist. The "Injury at Place of
Infringing Sales" rule avoids this outcome because both the "Act of
Infringement" approach and the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales"
theory result in proper jurisdiction where infringing sales have been
made. Even if federal courts were to agree uniformly that the "Injury
at Place of Patent" mode of reasoning correctly characterizes the injury of patent infringement, they should adopt the "Injury at Place of
Infringing Sales" rule because it avoids the clash between the "Act of
Infringement" approach and the "Injury at Place of Patent" theory
and produces consistent results for any fact pattem. 140 The possibility
of immunity from suit for alien infringers, resulting from the varying
interpretations of state long-arm statutes, provides the third practical
problem with the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach.
CONCLUSION

A careful analysis of the nature of the injuries caused by patent
infringement reveals that the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule
better characterizes the nature of these injuries. In addition, even if
courts uniformly adopted the "Injury at Place of Patent" theory, several practical problems would remain that would lead to potential immunity for alien infringers. Because the "Injury at Place of Infringing
Sales" approach avoids these practical problems and the necessity of
resolving the question of whether states should focus on the locus of
the tortious act or the tortious injury, it should be uniformly adopted
by all the district courts that must focus on the situs of the tortious
injury. Uniform adoption would allow a patent owner to sue an alien
in any district where infringing sales were made, thus eliminating the
possibility of immunity in paradigmatic cases such as those detailed in
the hypotheticals above.
In recent years, Congress has attempted to expand patent rights to
better prntect patent holders against infringement by aliens. District
139. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
140. Consistency of result is an important goal. Congress created the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to achieve consistency in patent cases by avoiding the "contradictory decisions often issued by the 12 existing Courts of Appeal and seldom untangled by the Supreme
Court." Dwyer et al., supra note 2, at 79.
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courts should further this objective by uniformly adopting the "Injury
at Place of Infringing Sales" rule. Effective enforcement of patent
laws against alien corporations is much more difficult if some infringers are immune from suit. Until Congress or the Supreme Court provides for a uniform rule, the district courts must achieve uniformity on
their own.

